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PRICING PRIVACY 
THE RIGHT TO KNOW THE VALUE OF YOUR PERSONAL DATA 
 




Abstract. The commodification of digital identities is an emerging reality in the data-driven 
economy. Personal data of individuals represent monetary value in the data-driven economy and are 
often considered a counter performance for “free” digital services or for discounts for online 
products and services. Furthermore, customer data and profiling algorithms are already considered a 
business asset and protected through trade secrets. At the same time, individuals do not seem to be 
fully aware of the monetary value of their personal data and tend to underestimate their economic 
power within the data-driven economy and to passively succumb to the propertization of their 
digital identity. An effort that can increase awareness and controllership of consumers/users on their 
own personal information could be making them aware of the monetary value of their personal data. 
In other words, if individuals are shown the “price” of their personal data, they can acquire higher 
awareness about their power in the digital market and thus be effectively empowered for the 
protection of their information privacy.  
This paper analyzes whether consumers/users should have a right to know the value of their 
personal data. After analyzing how EU legislation is already developing in the direction of 
propertization and monetization of personal data, different models for quantifying the value of 
personal data are investigated. These models are discussed, not to determine the actual prices of 
personal data, but to show that the monetary value of personal data can be quantified, a conditio-
sine-qua-non for the right to know the value of your personal data. Next, active choice models, in 
which users are offered the option to pay for online services, either with their personal data or with 
money, are discussed. It is concluded, however, that these models are incompatible with EU data 
protection law. Finally, practical and moral problems of pricing privacy are discussed and it is 
concluded that, although some of these problems are significant, they should not outweigh the 
benefits of introducing a right to know the value of your personal data. 
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The commodification of digital identities is an emerging reality in the data-driven economy.3 
Personal data of individuals represent monetary value in the data-driven economy and are often 
considered as a counter performance for “free” digital services or for discounts for online products 
and services.4  A recent proposal for an EU directive on the supply of digital content has 
acknowledged that personal data in the modern digital economy can be used, instead of money, to 
pay for digital content.5 At the same time, customer data and profiling algorithms are already 
considered a business asset and protected through trade secrets.6 However, problematic in this 
context is that individuals are not often aware of the monetary value of their personal data and tend 
to underestimate their economic power within the data market and to passively succumb to 
commodification of their digital identity.7 
Awareness of individuals is a core element in the big data era and the data-driven economy: it is 
the optimal balancing between fostering innovation (through the free flow of data) and protecting 
individuals’ human rights. Privacy and personal data protection has often been declined as a passive 
defence of individuals from collection, use and reuse of their data8. However, in the big data era, 
this seems to be both unrealistic and ineffective, because the limiting access and use of data is 
difficult to enforce and limits the opportunities that big data has to offer.9 Instead, a more realistic 
and effective approach towards effective protection of data subjects’ interests would be an active 
empowerment of individuals in their personal data management.  
An effort that can increase the awareness of and the control over their own personal information, 
could be making consumers/users aware of the monetary value of their personal data.10 In other 
words, if individuals are shown the “price” of their personal data, they can acquire higher awareness 
about their power in the digital market and thus be effectively empowered for the protection of their 
information privacy.11 
This is possible by several means. From a theoretical perspective, several solutions have been 
proposed to make individuals active players in the data economy, e.g. by forms of “quasi-property” 
																																																								
3  Corien Prins, The Propertization of Personal Data and Identities (2004), EJCL, www.ejcl.org/83/art83-1.html 
(accessed 12 June 2017). Nadhezda Purtova, The Illusion of Personal Data as No One’s Property (2015), Law, 
Innovation and Technology, vol. 7, n. 1, 2015. 
4 See Wolfie Christl and Sarah Spiekermann, Networks of Control: A Report on Corporate Surveillance, Digital 
Tracking, Big Data & Privacy (Facultas Verlags - und Buchhandels AG, 2016), 65-67. 
5 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for 
the supply of digital content, COM(2015) 634 final, Article 3 (1). 
6  Brenda Reddix-Smalls, ‘Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of 
Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the Finance Market’, (2011) 12 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 87, 117-18. 
7 Frederik Z. Borgesius., Behavioural Sciences And The Regulation Of Privacy On The Internet (2014), Amsterdam 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-54. 
8 World Economic Forum, Rethinking Personal Data: Strengthening Trust (2012), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_RethinkingPersonalData_Report_2012.pdf (Accessed 9 June 2017), p. 9. 
9 Bart H.M. Custers, ‘Click here to consent forever; Expiry dates for informed consent’, (2016),  Big Data & Society, 1-
6. 
10 See, e.g., Arslan Aziz and Rahul Telang, ‘What Is a Digital Cookie Worth?’ (March 31, 2016). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757325 (accessed 12 June 2017). 
11 Richard G. Newell, Juha V. & Siikamäki, ‘Nudging Energy Efficiency Behaviour: The Role of Information Labels’, 
(2014) 1 J. Association Environmental & Resource Economists 555, 593; Cristiano Codagnone, Francesco Bogliacino 
and Giuseppe Veltri, Testing CO2/Car labelling options and consumer information, Final Report (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/labelling/studies_en.htm at 9. 
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of individuals on their own data.12 From a more practical perspective, empowering individuals 
would mean enhancing controllership and awareness of data subjects in the data market. De lege 
lata, this is possible on the one hand through a full exercise of control rights (such as the right to 
data access, the right to rectification, the right to data portability, the right to be forgotten and the 
right to block the processing) and on the other hand through the right to receive appropriate 
information about data processing. An effort that can conciliate the theoretical approach to quasi-
propertization of personal data and the practical approach to increase awareness and controllership 
of consumers/users on their own personal information could be making data subjects aware of the 
monetary value of their personal data.13  
The traditional, passive approach to informational privacy has only protected data as per their 
personal/emotional (qualitative) value, but in order to reduce information asymmetry in the big data 
era and to make individuals stronger players in this data-driven economy, what is necessary is to 
provide more and more information about the monetary (quantitative) value, i.e., the quantum of 
their personal data value. This may better indicate the power that individuals really have or can 
have. It has been shown that if individuals were shown the price of their personal data, their 
awareness about data processing implications would strongly increase.14 In this paper we propose - 
de lege ferenda - to introduce a new right of data subjects to receive from data controllers (or an 
obligation for data controllers to provide to data subjects) information about the monetary value of 
their personal data.  
Firstly, it is analyzed how different types of business models trade personal data in the data-driven 
economy. These business models can be categorized according to their incentive structures (i.e., 
monetary and non-monetary) and types of use cases (i.e., providing online content, online services 
or offline services). Also, it is analyzed how EU legislation is already developing in the direction of 
propertization and monetization of personal data.  
Secondly, objective parameters for (estimate) pricing of data are examined, since providing data 
subjects with a right to know the value of their personal data is only feasible if it is actually possible 
to quantify the value of these personal data. Different pricing models are discussed, not to 
determine the actual prices of personal data, but to show that the monetary value of personal data 
can be quantified, a conditio-sine-qua-non for the right to know the value of your personal data. 
Objective parameters for pricing personal data are established via two methods: a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach. The first approach corresponds to the supply of digital data, while the second 
one corresponds to the demand of digital data. The top-down approach corresponds to the demand 
for digital data and an objective parameter can be found in the price that companies generally pay 
for personal data of individuals. There are already several studies on this subject, which are based 
on the businesses’ turnover derived from personalized advertisements.15 The bottom-up approach 
																																																								
12 Gianclaudio Malgieri, ‘Ownership” of Customer (Big) Data in the European Union: Quasi-Property as Comparative 
Solution?’,  (2016) Journal of Internet Law, Vol. 20, n.5,  2 ff. 
13 See, e.g., Arslan Aziz and Rahul Telang, ‘What Is a Digital Cookie Worth?’ (2016). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757325 (accessed 12 June 2017). 
14 Richard G. Newell, Juha V. & Siikamäki, ‘Nudging Energy Efficiency Behaviour: The Role of Information Labels’, 
(2014) 1 J. Association Environmental & Resource Economists 555, 593, Cristiano Codagnone, Francesco Bogliacino 
and Giuseppe Veltri, Testing CO2/Car labelling options and consumer information, Final Report (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/labelling/studies_en.htm (accessed 12 June 2017) , at 9. 
15 John Rose, Olaf Rehse, and Björn Röber, The value of our digital identity (2016, New York: The Boston Consulting 
Group). See also Arslan Aziz and Rahul Telang, ‘What Is a Digital Cookie Worth?’, op.cit. 
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corresponds to the supply of digital data and is based on a “reverse liability” paradigm,16 i.e., 
measuring the value of personal data in terms of damage to privacy or loss of privacy17 and also in 
terms of increase of consumer asymmetry. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to find a practical way in which this explicit pricing of personal data can be 
introduced in the digital market. It has already been proposed as a solution to provide an active 
choice to data subjects:18 when individuals register for a service, they might be asked if they want to 
pay with money or with their personal data (and with this they usually accept that data controllers 
use algorithms to profile their personality). It will be shown, however, that these active choice 
models are not compatible with the new EU data protection legislation (the General Data Protection 
Regulation). Article 7(4) states that when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account 
shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a 
service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the 
performance of that contract. In other words, it is not possible for service providers to deny the 
provision of a digital service after the consent to personal data processing that is not necessary for 
performing the contract has been withdrawn. Indeed, if customers accept to “pay by data” and later 
withdraw their consent regarding the processing of unnecessary personal data, they cannot be 
denied the provision of the digital service. As a result, service providers and data controllers may 
end up without payment for their services.  
That is why a new data subject right or data controllers “information duty” is the only legal option 
compatible with the EU privacy approach. What we propose here is an alternative solution: the 
addition of a new specific obligation to the “information duties” (e.g., under article 13 of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation): in all forms of data processing in which the value of data 
subject’s personal data is relevant for the economic transaction, the price of these data (calculated 
on objective parameters) should be communicated to the data subject. Such a disruptive proposal 
may increase the shift from privacy as a passive protection, to privacy as an active empowerment of 
individuals and may, as such, enhance the protection of the right to data protection that each 
individual has under Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
It is obvious that this proposed right to know the value of your personal data also entails several 
practical problems (such as choosing a pricing method, issues regarding control and consent and 
issues regarding governance and enforcement) and moral problems (such as the commodification of 
inalienable and non-negotiable human rights and the potential reinforcement of existing disparities 
in society). For instance, data subjects having a lower propensity to consume and presumably lower 
incomes have less valuable data than other consumers 19  and could have worse contractual 
																																																								
16 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972), Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1983, 1116 as rephrased (in the field of personal data) by Gintare 
Surblyte, ‘Data as Digital Resource’, (2016). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 
16-12, 37. 
17 Daniel J. Solove, and Danielle K. Citron, ‘Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms’ (forthcoming 2017) 
96 Texas Law Review. 
18 Bilyana Petkova and Philipp Hacker, ‘Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New 
Regulatory Frontiers’ (2016), Lecturer and Other Affiliate Scholarship Series. Paper 13.  
19 Emily Steel, Callum Locke, Emily Cadman and Ben Freese, ‘How much is your personal data worth?’, Financial 
Times, (12 June 2013), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b-11e2-88ed-
00144feab7de.html?ft_site=falcon#axzz2z2agBB6R (accessed 12 June 2017). see also Emily Steele, Financial worth of 
data comes in at under a penny a piece, Financial Times, June 12, 2013. 
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conditions. 20  We recognize that some of these problems are significant and provide some 
suggestions to mitigate them. Even though not all of these problems can be solved, we think these 
do not outweigh the benefits of introducing a right to know the value of your personal data. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 investigates different types of business models that 
trade personal data in the data-driven economy and analyzes how EU legislation is already 
developing in the direction of propertization and monetization of personal data. Section 3 
investigates how the value of personal data can be quantified. It is not tried to determine the actual 
prices of personal data, but to show that the monetary value of personal data can be quantified. 
Section 4 examines why active choice models are not a viable alternative to empower people, as 
this is incompatible with EU data protection law. Section 5 examines practical and moral problems 
that the right to know the value of your personal data may raise. Suggestions are made on how to 





The monetization of personal data is already a reality in nearly all fields of the digital market. The 
European Commission has highlighted that the market for consumers’ data is growing fast and 
business models based on monetizing data become predominant21 and a large share of consumers 
access digital services offered in return for their personal data. This is the case for around 30% of 
antivirus and navigation software and cloud storage services, 77% of streamed events and more 
than 50% of movies, film, TV content, e-books and games22. Ensuring an adequate level of 
protection for these consumers would increase overall consumers' confidence.23 The economic 
advantage for customers is balanced by the value of personal profiling which they usually allow by 
disclosing their personal data. In more technical terms, we can enlist at least three use cases: 
a. the “free” or discounted provision of online services,  
b. the “free” or discounted provision of (valuable) online content  
c. and a “free” or discounted provision of an “offline” service (e.g., insurance, mortgage). 
Regarding the first type of use cases, “free” online services”, some relevant examples are “free” 
wifi services in public spaces, for instance, in airports, when users need to accept cookies and 
trackers and give their email address if they want to navigate on the Internet. In other words, if they 
want a free provision of Internet data, they must disclose to the provider (and often to provider’s 
partners) a chronology of websites visited, queries, mailing address, location data, etc. and thus 
accept a personal profiling.24 Similar considerations can be made for free cloud services or social 
networks. A typical example of the second type of use cases are music platforms, like Spotify, 
where users can access nearly all kind of songs or music pieces at high quality, even if protected by 
copyright, for free. Customers are asked to create a social profile and to authorize Spotify access to 
																																																								
20 Lauren Henry Scholz, ‘Algorithmic Contracts’ (2016), Stanford Technology Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747701 (accessed 12 June 2017) 
21 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposals for Directives of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (1) on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, 
COM/2015/0634 final 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
24 See, e.g., Ningning Chen, Xinlei Oscar Wang, Prasant Mohapatra, Aruna Seneviratne, ‘Characterizing privacy 
leakage of public WiFi networks for users on travel Conference Paper’ in Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM (2013). 
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their profile data on Facebook. An example of the third type of use cases is the discount in life 
insurance policies when using of health trackers. In 2015, John Hancock, one of the largest life 
insurers in the U.S., teamed up with Vitality, a corporate wellness provider, to offer policy holders a 
discount when they let a free Fitbit device track their activities. Consumers receive personalized 
health goals and can log their activities using online and automated tools. By gaining so-called 
“Vitality Points” they can get a discount of up to 15% on their life insurance policy.25 
The classification of “free” or discounted provision of digital services, digital content or offline 
services can also be observed under a different perspective.26 In strictly economical terms, the 
transaction between a consumer and a company where there is a mutual exchange of products or 
services and information is called a “composite transaction” and is different from an “information 
transaction” when there is a mere flow of information from the consumer to the company. 
Composite transactions are based on two different steps: the company offers services or products 
and the consumer purchases them. When the company offers services or products, it also provides 
information regarding these goods or services and regarding the transaction. At the same time, 
when the consumer purchases the service or product he or she can “pay” in different manners. 
Usually in the digital market it is possible to pay with money, with (personal) information, or both. 
This is sometimes referred to as “disclosure as by-product”.27 
Since the disclosure of data is an additional element of the traditional exchange of products or 
services for money, in terms of business models, these business-to-consumer transactions can be 
classified as follows: 
1. Monetary incentives for disclosure as by-product: 
1.1. Savings: consumers are encouraged to disclose their personal data by a discount covering a 
part or the totality of the price. 
1.2. Earnings: consumers are encouraged to disclose their personal data via a monetary benefit 
(e.g. a digital wallet).28 There are in particular two companies who provide “digital wallets” 
for the disclosure of personal data: Handshake and Brave. The former is a platform for 
finding a job where disclosing personal data can turn into money.29 The latter is a browser 
which blocks all online ads, except those from known advertisers that have accepted to 
share a part of their income with data users; accordingly users can earn digital money that 
they can only spend on financing their favourite content provider. 30 
2. Non-monetary incentives for disclosure as by-product: 
																																																								
25 Wolfie Christl, Sarah Spiekermann, Networks of Control: A Report on Corporate Surveillance, Digital Tracking, 
Big Data & Privacy (Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG, 2016), 66-67 and 290. See also John Hancock (2015): 
‘John Hancock Introduces a Whole New Approach to Life Insurance in the U.S. that Rewards Customers for Healthy 
Living’ (April 8, 2015), http://www.johnhancock.com/about/news_details.php?fn=apr0815-text&yr=2015, (accessed 12 
June 2017). See also for more detalis on the Fitbit program: http://www.thevitalitygroup.com/john-hancock-enters-
exclusive-partnership-with-vitality (accessed 12 June 2017). 
26 see Nicola Jentzsch, State-of-the-Art of the Economics of Cyber-Security and Privacy, IPACSO - Innovation 
Framework for ICT Security Deliverable, No. 4.1 (2016), § 3.2.1. 
27 Nicola Jentzsch, Andreas Harasser, Sören Preibusch, Monetising Privacy – An Economic Model of the Pricing of 
Personal Information, ENISA Report, (2012) Greece, www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity (accessed 12 June 2017). 
28 This classification is only partially taken from Nicola Jentzsch, The-state-of-the-Art, (2016), op.cit. § 3.2.1, Table 8. 
Actually that classification does not consider the case of no incentives and classifies differently the monetary 
incentives, i.e. “earnings” and “payments”, where earnings means any economic advantage, while payments means that 
consumers pays in order to control more their information. 
29 Natasha Lomas, ‘Handshake Is A Personal Data Marketplace Where Users Get Paid To Sell Their Own Data’, Tech 
Crunch, (2 September 2013), <https://techcrunch.com/2013/09/02/handshake/> (accessed 28 May 2017). 
30 See <https://brave.com/assets/img/press/brave_infographic_large.png> (accessed 29 may 2017).  
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2.1. A counter-service, in particular personalization: consumers are encouraged to disclose their 
personal data by a more tailored service, e.g., a personalized search engine or a 
personalized social network platform. In some cases, the online services offered may lose 
some functionality when they cannot be personalized. 
2.2. No incentives: none of the above incentives applies. In these cases, often consumers have 
an all-or-nothing choice when disclosing their personal data. 
 
Combining this transaction structure classification with the different types of use cases mentioned 
above yields different business models. Table 1 shows examples of companies using these different 
types of business models. 
	
     Incentives 
Provision  
Monetary Non-monetary 
Savings Earnings Personalization No incentives 
Digital Content Spotify  Spotify iTunes 





Offline Service Hancock 
insurance 
Handshake Experian Traditional 
insurance, etc. 
 
Table 1: Examples of companies using different business models based on different transaction 





EU legislation is increasingly taking into account the reality described above. A typical example is 
the proposed EU directive on “certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital 
content”.31 With regard to the provision of valuable online content for free, the scope of this 
proposed directive is restricted in Article 3(1) to any contract where the supplier provides digital 
content to the consumer or undertakes to do so and, in exchange, a price is to be paid or the 
consumer actively provides counter-performance other than money in the form of personal data or 
any other data”. Recital 13 remarks indeed that “in the digital economy, information about 
individuals is often and increasingly seen by market participants as having a value comparable to 
money. Digital content is often supplied not in exchange for a price but against counter-
performance other than money, i.e., by giving access to personal data or other data. Those specific 
business models apply in different forms in a considerable part of the market”.  
The choice to consider also “free” services “paid by data” within the scope of the proposed 
directive is due to many factors. First of all, introducing a differentiation depending on the nature of 
the counter-performance would discriminate between different business models providing an 
unjustified incentive for businesses to move towards offering digital content against data. In 
addition, “defects of the performance features of the digital content supplied against counter-
performance other than money may have an impact on the economic interests of consumers”. In 
																																																								
31 COM/2015/0634 final. 
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other words, a narrow scope would not ensure a high level and future-proof consumer protection.32 
In addition, the impact assessment underlines that the strongest impact of rules covering digital 
content provided in exchange for personal data will be increasing consumers' awareness of the 
economic value of their personal data and further contribute to better protection. 
Recital 14 clarifies also that that Directive shall apply only when the customer actively 
supplies the data (so excluding the case in which the customer accepts cookies), which are not 
necessary for the digital content to function in conformity with the contract. According to the 
principle of data minimization (see Article 5(1)(c), GDPR) personal data processed must be 
adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed. In other words, unless paying with sources “other than money” is part of the declared 
(and legitimate) purpose, any form of processing of data that are unnecessary for the execution of a 
contract might be a violation of data minimization principle. The impact assessment of the proposed 
directive clarifies that the extended scope is consistent with the existing personal data protection 
framework, which recognises the high importance and value of personal data and that “it does not 
overlap with data protection rules”. However, in order to respect and not overlap with data 
protection rules, the only possibility is that the data controller when collecting data declares the 
purpose of such data processing and the value the data represents. 
Obviously, this is still a proposal and the European Commission mentions also (in its impact 
assessment) that companies (including those active in the field of digital content development) are 
against such an extension and advised against overlaps with data protection rules. In particular, 
some companies argued that the focus should not be on whether the data had been actively provided 
but rather on how this data is used by the data controllers. For our purposes, we must at least 
highlight that the EU legislator is starting to acknowledge the de facto monetisation of personal data 
and is trying to regulate it, though indirectly. 
Also some digital service providers are starting to admit (perhaps unconsciously) that 
personal data and user-generated content are a form of payment. A typical example is the End-User 
Licence Agreement of Instagram, in which Article 1 states that “on Instagram the user provides 
Instagram with a non-exclusive licence, totally paid [for with] the use of content that he or she 
publishes on Instagram”.33 On Instagram the registration is free and users do not receive any 
monetary benefit when they share content (such as images), so the expression “totally paid” seems 
to refer to non-monetary payment. In other words, according to Instagram’s Terms of Use,34 it 
seems that users and service providers perform a transaction in which users pay to Instagram for 
registration, while Instagram pays to users for having a licence on user generated content. These 
bilateral payments balance out into a zero-sum and so a “free” digital transaction reveals to be a 





32 See the Impact Assessment, supra. 
33 See Instagram Terms of Use, § “Rights”, Art. 1, < https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511> accessed 29 May 
2017. Italics added. 
34 The deceptive nature of Social media Terms of Use has been however addressed recently in European Commission - 
Press release, The European Commission and Member States consumer authorities ask social media companies to 
comply with EU consumer rules, Brussels, 17 March 2017, < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-631_en.htm> 
(accessed 29 May 2017). 
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When asking how much a person’s data is worth, the answer is: not much. General information 
about a person, such as age, gender and location is worth a mere 0.05 cent. Persons who are 
shopping for a car, a financial product or a vacation are more valuable to companies that want to 
pitch those goods. For instance, personal data of auto buyers are worth about 0.21 cent per person.35 
Personal data of people going through certain life events, such as becoming a parent, moving, 
getting engaged or getting divorced, also prompt companies to pay more for personal data. For 
instance, personal data of a pregnant woman are worth about 11 cent.36 More sensitive personal data 
are more valuable. Personal data containing specific health conditions or information on taking 
certain prescriptions are worth about 26 cent per person. But even adding up all these details means 
the sum total for most individuals is less than a dollar.37 However, in principle the data can be sold 
and resold many times. 
It is important to mention that with the development of the data economy, prices of personal 
data are rapidly going down. For instance, a zip code in the US cost 50 cents in 2006 and 0,05 cents 
in 2013.38 This is not only due to lower costs of data collection, but also due to a significant 
increase in the use of personal data for profiling and marketing.39 Furthermore, personal data has 
become ubiquitous, particularly in the United States where personal data can be traded freely, 
which also drives down prices. 
Providing data subjects with a right to know the value of their personal data is only feasible 
if it is actually possible to quantify the value of these personal data. It is sometimes argued that the 
value of personal data is intangible, risk-dependent, context-dependent and diffuse40. Also, the 
underlying values that are at stake, such as privacy, are hard to quantify. For instance, disclosure of 
personal data may lead to increased risks of future identity theft or fraud, but interpreting such 
increased risks as actual harm may be too speculative.41 It might be argued that if it is impossible to 
quantify the value of personal data, then granting data subjects a right to know the value of their 
personal data is not realistic. 
However, in this section we argue that assessing the value of personal data is not impossible. 
It is not even that difficult. But there are some choices to be made, as there exist multiple ways to 
assess the value of personal data. Attaching a monetary value to personal data requires some clarity 
on (1) how to express monetary value, (2) which object is actually being priced, and (3) how to 
attach the value to the object, i.e., the actual pricing system. Hence, in Section 3.1 we start with 
discussing in which units the value of personal data could or should be expressed. In Section 3.2 we 
discuss which object is actually being priced and related pricing factors. In Section 3.3 we discuss a 
number of ways in which the value of personal data can be assessed. These are concrete pricing 
systems for personal data. 
																																																								
35 Emily Steel, ‘Financial worth of data comes in at under a penny a piece’, (2013),  op.cit. 
36 Ibid. 
37 The Financial Times has developed a calculator for what a person’s personal data is worth. By answering questions 
on demographics, family & health, property, activities and consumer characteristics, a person can calculate the value of 
his or her personal data.  See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b-11e2-88ed-
00144feab7de.html?ft_site=falcon#axzz4dMtRPoZd  (accessed 12 June 2017). 
38  Jay MacDonald, ‘How much are your personal details worth?’, (21 February 2006), Bankrate.com, 
http://www.bankrate.com/nsccan/news/pf/20060221b1.asp (accessed 12 June 2017). 
39 More-with-mobile, ‘Prices and Value of Consumer Data’ (2013) http://www.more-with-mobile.com/2013/06/prices-
and-value-of-consumer-data.html (accessed 12 June 2017).  
40 OECD, Data-driven Innovation for Growth and Well-being, Interim Synthesis Report (2014). 
41 See, for instance, US case law: Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2008); Guin v Higher 





Before discussing these pricing systems, it is important to first consider the way in which to express 
the value of personal data. Intuitively, it would make sense to express the monetary value of 
personal data in a currency like dollars or euros. However, since personal data are a different 
product than other, tangible products there are some issues that require further qualifications of this 
currency based pricing approach. 
The first issue is that personal data change over time and may get outdated. For instance, 
people move and get other addresses. Also, people may change their interests over time, sometimes 
gradually (for instance, when they grow older), sometimes immediately (for instance, when they 
have big life events, like getting married, getting children, facing serious diseases, etc.). As a result, 
personal data may change and get outdated and, most importantly in this discussion, may lose some 
of its value. Although we are not suggesting that historical data may not have any value, for 
purposes like advertising personal data that is up-to-date has the most value. After data (or 
aggregated datasets) grow older, their value may decrease. Data has to be ‘fresh’ to be attractive for 
companies. Hence, it makes sense to argue that personal data is a dynamic product, rather than a 
static product. Accordingly, it could be argued that the value of personal data may be expressed in 
terms of euros or dollars per month, rather than in euros or dollars. As will be explained below, this 
also reflects pricing systems that use subscriptions and leases of data rather than selling data. 
The second issue is that data, also personal data, can easily be reused.42 Contrary to tangible 
products that can only be sold once by a particular owner, data can be copied without additional 
costs and sold multiple times. Hence, when someone owns personal data, he or she can sell it 
multiple times. A data subject can sell his or her personal data to different companies. The number 
of times data can be reused, determines its value. From the perspective of the data subject, it may be 
interesting to reuse the same personal data many times to create more value. However, from the 
perspective of a company that collects personal data, it can only collect personal data from each 
data subject once. Obviously data collectors can strive for collecting more detailed and complete 
data on each data subject, each piece of data can only be collected once (unless it has become 
outdated as explained above). Hence, from the perspective of data collectors it makes sense to 





In the previous section, the term personal data was used in a general way. When raising the question 
what the value of someone’s personal data is, the immediate response is: which data? Does this 
refer to all of your personal data or to a specific set, like the personal data on someone’s Facebook 
profile, someone’s credit card details or someone’s online behaviour and preferences? In this 
section, we discuss which object is actually being priced when pricing privacy or pricing personal 
data and related pricing factors.  
																																																								
42 Bart H.M. Custers & Helena Ursic, ‘Big data and data reuse: a taxonomy of data reuse for balancing big data benefits 
and personal data protection’ (2016), International Data Privacy Law 6(1): 4-15. 
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A first step in this brief analysis is to consider pricing each individual attribute in a personal 
record. It could be argued that personal data consists of many different attributes of a data subject, 
often starting with his or her name, address and city of residence. Other common attributes are date 
of birth, gender, marital status, profession, bank account numbers, etc. More subjective attributes 
include, for instance, hobbies, interests, preferences. Some of these attributes may also be objective, 
when predicted on the basis of big data.43 Such predictions and statistics may include preferences, 
life expectancies, credit scores and health risks. We argue that it does not make sense to price the 
value of each individual attribute in a personal record, as it is the combination of attributes that 
actually creates value. When the attribute name is provided as ‘John’ or the attribute gender is 
provided as ‘male’, these are meaningless. Single attributes without any further context have no 
monetary value. Only when combined, i.e., when John is male, these attributes create value.  
Hence, pricing personal data is not about pricing individual attributes, but either about 
pricing attributes of a person or about pricing combinations of attributes. In other words, pricing 
personal data is about datasets, not about single data, where a datasets starts with combining two 
data items. In practice, however, many datasets are much larger, increasing the value of personal 
data. For instance, Axciom, one of the leading US personal data brokers has an average of 1,500 
pieces of information on each data subject.44 It can also be argued that pricing personal data is in 
fact pricing digital identities, which are the sum of all digitally available information about an 
individual.45 These digital identities are becoming increasingly complete and traceable, driven by 
the exponential growth of available data and technologies to combine and process these data. 
Pricing digital identities or digital profiles (rather than single attributes) also corresponds better to 
the practice in which companies that purchase datasets are usually obliged to buy in bulk.46 
In fact, the size of datasets and the completeness of datasets are important factors in 
determining the monetary value of personal data. Knowing that John is male is probably worth less 
than knowing that John is a male, 35-year old married physician living in a Milwaukee suburb and 
interested in baseball, jogging and movies. Still, the missing surname of John may affect the value 
of these personal data negatively. Also, the accuracy and extent to which these data are up-to-date 
affect the monetary value of these personal data. For instance, when these data refer to 1952, they 
represent a different value then when they refer to 2017. It is important to note that accuracy rates in 
datasets are often low. For instance, Acxiom, one of the leading US personal data brokers, has 
estimated accuracy rates of 50 %.47  
Some data items in a record or profile may be worth more than other data items. For 
instance, several sensitive characteristics, such as those referring to ethnicity, religion, health, union 
membership, politics, criminal records, substance abuse and sexual preferences, are more ‘telling’ 
about people. Many people also tend to treat these characteristics with more care and disclose them 
less often. As such, the availability and nature of these characteristics is more rare and unique and 
																																																								
43 Bart H.M. Custers, ‘Predicting Data that People Refuse to Disclose; How Data Mining Predictions Challenge 
Informational Self-Determination’, (2012) Privacy Observatory Magazine 2012(3). 
44 Paul Boutin, ‘The Secretive World of Selling Data about You’ (2016), Newsweek,  
http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789 (accessed 12 June 2017). 
45 John Rose, Olaf Rehse, and Björn Röber, The value of our digital identity (2016, New York: The Boston Consulting 
Group). 
46 More-with-mobile, ‘Prices and Value of Consumer Data’ (2013) http://www.more-with-mobile.com/2013/06/prices-
and-value-of-consumer-data.html (accessed 12 June 2017). 
47 Paul Boutin, ‘The Secretive World of Selling Data about You’ (2016), Newsweek,  
http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789 (accessed 12 June 2017). 
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makes them harder to collect. As in general economics, when there is less supply, prices tend to go 
up.48  
A final pricing factor is the level of identifiability of personal data.49 Anonymous data does 
have monetary value, as it may be very useful for several purposes, including policy-making, 
strategic decision-making and scientific goals. Big data may reveal patterns that are useful for 
targeted approaches that are not on an individual level. For instance, knowing that diapers and beer 
cans are usually bought together by customers, especially on Saturdays, is anonymous data that is 
very useful for targeted marketing and advertising. Nevertheless, knowing the identifying data of 
the individuals that fall into this category may be worth even more, as it allows an even further 
personalised marketing and advertising approach. 
In summary, when pricing personal data it makes sense to focus on datasets (i.e., digital 
identities or digital profiles) rather than on pricing individual attributes. Altogether there are many 
factors that affect the price of personal data. Factors as size, completeness, accuracy, being up-to-
date, rareness and uniqueness, and identifiability can all influence the value. The question is 
obviously how to add weight to these factors. That, in short, depends on the context and purposes 
for which the personal data are collected and used. How to determine the actual value of personal 




There is research available on estimating the value of personal data. A good starting point is OECD 
survey on methodologies for measuring monetary value of personal data.50 OECD distinguishes 
methods that are based on market valuation, and methods that are based on individual’s valuation. 
The market valuation methods focus on (a) financial results for data records, i.e., market 
cap/revenues/net income per data record, (b) market prices for data, i.e., price per personal data 
entry offered on the market by data brokers, (c) cost of a data breaches, i.e., economic cost of a data 
breach (for firms and individuals) per data entry and (d) data prices in illegal markets, i.e., 
estimation of prices of personal data in illegal markets. The individual’s valuation methods focus on 
(e) surveys and economic experiments, i.e., valuation of personal data in monetary terms that are 
reported by individuals in surveys or economic experiments and (f) data on willingness of users to 
pay to protect their data, i.e., amounts that individuals are ready to spend to protect their personal 
data. 
Each of these elements has its drawbacks. As for market-based valuations, the problem is that 
other factors are often priced-in and several externalities are not considered.51 For financial results 
(a), it is highly dependent of the revenues and income of a specific companies. For market prices 
(b), it does not consider the different contexts in which data are demanded. For cost of data 
breaches (c), there is not any direct proportionality between damages caused by data breach and the 
actual value of personal data (e.g., damages may include also other factors, like damages to cyber-
infrastructures). For illegal markets (d) it does not consider the costs of illegal activities in terms of 
																																																								
48 At the same time, the value of redundant data is zero. For instance, when a record shows both someone’s age and date 
of birth, one of these can be used to calculate the other. 
49 See Nicola Jentzsch, State-of-the-Art of the Economics of Cyber-Security and Privacy, op.cit., § 3.2.3.2. 
50 OECD, Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, 
OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 220, (2013, OECD Publishing). 
51 Nicola Jentzsch, State-of-the-Art of the Economics of Cyber-Security and Privacy, op.cit., § 3.8.1 
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risks for intruders.52 All these measures are unilateral and incomplete. Furthermore, they do not 
consider how much the data are worth for data subjects. However, individual-based valuations (e 
and f) are also incomplete, because they are not incentive-compatible.53 Especially for willingness 
to pay to protect data (f) it has been proven that it does not capture the actual perceived value of 
personal data.54 
A hybrid methodology which compares a bottom-up and a top-down approach has been proposed 
by Petkova and Hacker (2016).55 The bottom-up approach starts with assessing the value of 
personal data for advertising. Companies can charge roughly ten times more for personalized 
advertising than for standard advertising. This difference can be explained by the fact that 
personalised advertising is a more targeted approach in which no efforts, time and money are 
wasted on people who are unlikely to respond the advertising anyway. According to industry 
sources, 1000 personalised advertisements on Facebook mobile would cost approximately 50 cents 
and about one dollar for the desktop version of Facebook. Hence, each personalized advertisement 
costs between 0.05 and 0.10 cents. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, it may be argued that a price per month makes more sense than a 
single price expressed in euros or dollars. Assuming that the average users sees about 20 
advertisements a day, the revenue from personalized advertising based on personal data for a single 
data subject is between 1 and 2 cents per day or between 30 and 60 cents per month.56 Obviously, 
this does not include any further sale, lease or subscriptions to the same data. When this is included, 
it is likely that the value of personal data will be in the range of 1 to 10 dollars. 
The top-down approach estimates the value of personal data with a different calculation strategy, 
in which the total revenue and the total number of users of a company processing personal data are 
used as a starting point. For instance, Facebook had a total revenue of 17.93 billion dollars in 2015, 
most of which was revenue from advertising.57 At the end of 2015, the total number of users was 
1.59 billion.58 Thus, Facebook generates an average of about ten dollars of revenue from advertising 
per per year, which is about one dollar per month. The results of this calculation are in line (same 
magnitude) with the bottom-up approach. 
This approach does not take into account the price at which data subjects would be likely to 
disclose their own personal data. That is why it may be argued that the loss of privacy is also 
included in the pricing of personal data. Since individuals tend to under-estimate the effects of 
disclosing their own personal data and are often unconscious of inferences, predictions and 
discrimination that can arise from personal data that they disclose,59 the impact of privacy harms 
can better be determined by Data Protection Authorities. Privacy harms can be either subjective 
																																																								
52 Ibid. See also OECD, Exploring the Economics of Personal Data, op.cit. 
53 Nicola Jentzsch, State-of-the-Art of the Economics of Cyber-Security and Privacy, 2016, op.cit., § 3.8.1. 
54 Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John and George Loewenstein, ‘What Is Privacy Worth?’, (2013) Journal of Legal 
Studies: 42 (2)1, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jls/vol42/iss2/ (accessed 28 May 2017). 
55 Bilyana Petkova and Philipp Hacker, ‘Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New 
Regulatory Frontiers’, (2016) Yale Law School: Lecturer and Other Affiliate Scholarship Series, paper 13. 
56 This is in line with other sources, for instance, More-with-mobile, ‘Prices and Value of Consumer Data’ (2013) 
http://www.more-with-mobile.com/2013/06/prices-and-value-of-consumer-data.html (accessed 12 June 2017). 
57 See www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/fb/financials (accessed 12 June 2017). 
58  See www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide (accessed 12 June 
2017). 
59 Bart H.M. Custers, Simone van der Hof S& Bart Schermer, ‘Privacy Expectations of Social Media Users: The Role 
of Informed Consent in Privacy Policies’, (2014) Policy and Internet 6(3): 268-295. 
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harms (i.e., the distress for data breach)60 or objective harms (i.e., information asymmetry and 
discrimination).61 When individuals disclose their data they suffer an objective loss of privacy in 
terms of higher exposure to discrimination (including price discrimination) and information 
asymmetry, which may yield commercial vulnerability. Subjective harms may be difficult to 
quantify, though this may not be entirely impossible.62 Objective harms are more straightforward to 
be quantified by courts or Data Protection Authorities. There is case law available that has 
monetized privacy damages in terms of discrimination and vulnerability risks.63 Obviously, these 
examples of pricing privacy by courts involve cases in which actual violations of privacy rights 
took place. These pricing methods can be used in the context of the right to know the value of your 
personal data by applying so-called “reverse liability”.64 This means calculating a compensation 
that a potential infringer (e.g., a company, a data controller) pays ex ante in order to be allowed to 
perform a probably harmful activity (e.g., processing personal data). 
The wide range of methods discussed in this section shows that monetary value of personal data 
value can be quantified. The aim of this paper is not to determine the actual prices of personal data, 
but to show that this important requirement for the right to know the value of your personal data is 





There are several ways to increasing consumers’ awareness about monetisation of personal data in 
the modern information society. It may be suggested that there are better alternatives for a right to 
know the value of your personal data. Particularly so-called “active choice” models are often 
mentioned in this respect.65 These models refer to an active choice for consumers between paying 
for a digital service with money (without any consent to the service provider to perform a profiling 
on the customer data) and accessing the service for free while disclosing personal data, usually 
allowing personal profiling. In other words, the active choice is between paying by data and paying 
by money. At the same time, data controllers who provide digital services would have the 
obligation to provide this active choice to their customers. This approach addresses the problem of 
unilateral monetisation of personal data in the modern digital economy and it proposes an effective 
safeguard that might actively increase awareness of data subjects and empower them in the digital 
market. Indeed, according to the “active choice” model, the flow of data or money in the supply of 
digital services would depend on individual choices. 
																																																								
60 See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms’, (2017) GW Law 
School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 2017-2. 
61 Ryan M. Calo, ‘The Boundaries of Privacy Harm’ (2011), Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 86: Iss. 3, Article 8. 
62 Daniel J. Solove, and Danielle K. Citron, ‘Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms’ (2017), op.cit. 
63 See, e.g., in the US jurisprudence, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (requiring component counsel to 
inform client of potential “adverse immigration consequences”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) 
(defining “disparate impact” as having a “disproportionately adverse effect on minorities”); Safeco Ins. Co. of America 
v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 62 (2007) (discussing “adverse effects” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act). See a general 
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and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1983, 1116 as rephrased (in 
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& Competition Research Paper, No. 16-12, 37. 
65 Bilyana Petkova and Philipp Hacker, ‘Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New 
Regulatory Frontiers’, (2016), op.cit. 
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However, active choice models have several compatibility problems with the EU legal 
framework for personal data protection, particularly with regard to the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). Article 7(4) of the GDPR, when referring to the assessment of freedom of 
consent for the processing of personal data, states that “utmost account shall be taken of whether, 
inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on 
consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that 
contract”. In other words, if a data subject is asked to consent to the processing of personal data 
(which is not necessary for the performance of that contract) in order to have access to a service or 
for the performance of a contract, it is highly probable that his consent is not “free”, and so it is not 
valid under the GDPR.66 
In the active choice model, individuals might “pay by data”, i.e., they would be required to 
consent to authorize access to and processing of personal data that is not necessary for the provision 
of that service. Once they pay with their data, they cannot withdraw their consent freely: given that 
personal data would be a “counter-performance other than money”, blocking that data processing 
would mean blocking the provision of that service. But, as also recital 42 of GDPR states, the 
withdrawal of consent must be “without detriment” to the data subject. In sum, it seems that the 
active choice model is not compatible with the EU data protection legislation. That brings us back 
to our proposal to introduce a right to know the value of your personal data rather than the right to 
have an active choice between paying with money or with personal data.  
Research has shown that informing consumers about prices is a very effective way to 
increase attention of consumers while reading pre-contractual information papers and so to increase 
consumers’ awareness.67 In the GDPR there are several provisions about the duty to inform data 
subjects. In particular, articles 13, 14 and 15 provide a list of pieces of information that should be 
given to data subjects in different situations. The data subject has the right to know (inter alia) the 
identity and the contact details of the controller, the purposes of the processing for which the 
personal data are intended, the categories of personal data concerned, the period for which the 
personal data will be stored, from which source the personal data originate, and if applicable, 
whether it came from publicly accessible sources, the existence of data subject’s rights, the 
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling and, at least in those cases, meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of 
such processing for the data subject.68 
Although this is an extensive list of information duties, there is no specific provision 
referring to the economic value of personal data or personal profiling. Data controllers should 
inform individuals about the purpose of data processing. If data controllers process personal data as 
a counter-performance other than money, they should clearly declare that purpose to the data 
subject, otherwise any processing of personal data which are not necessary for the declared purpose 
(e.g., performance of a contract) would be a breach of the data minimization principle and the 
purpose limitation principle.69 In other words, any case in which unnecessary70 personal data is 
																																																								
66 See the definition of “consent” at Article 4, GDPR. 
67 Richard G. Newell, Juha V. & Siikamäki, ‘Nudging Energy Efficiency Behaviour: The Role of Information Labels’, 
(2014), op.cit. 
68 See article 13(1-2), 14(1-2), 15(1), GDPR. 
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processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes” (lett. c). 
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collected as a “counter-performance other than money” for the provision of a service, it must be 
declared. 
Obviously, unnecessary personal data (for instance, via cookies) are often collected via 
“alternative” purposes, such as improving the provision of a digital service or improving the 
experience of customers. Although data controllers should declare that personal data which are not 
necessary for the performance of a contract are collected as an alternative payment for that service, 
they do not have any duty to “price” those data or to inform users about these prices. That is why 
we propose de lege ferenda adding a new right to information to article 13 and 14 GDPR: in each 
data processing where the value of customers’ personal data is relevant for the economic 
transaction, the price of these data should be communicated to the consumer. 
To further concretize this provision, Data Protection Authorities should be entitled to monitor 
and enforce this obligation. They could ex ante release guidelines about actual prices to be set for 
personal data, releasing tables for personalization of prices, describing circumstances in which these 





In this section we discuss some problems of the idea to introduce the right to know the value of our 
own personal data in EU data protection law. In Section 5.1 we discuss practical problems and in 




There are several practical problems raised by the implementation of the right to know the value of 
your personal data. The first problem is that of determining the actual prices. As discussed in 
Section 3, there are several methods for this. A choice can be made for one of these methods, but 
each choice may have drawbacks in the ways the calculation reflects the actual value of personal 
data. In other words, each method for determining prices is simply a reflection, an approximation of 
the actual value and may sometimes be a close estimate, but at other times significantly wrong. We 
think this may still work, as choosing a method, even when it occasionally is off mark, is better than 
nothing. 
A second, related practical problem is who should do the pricing. The most obvious choice 
is to let data controllers do the pricing, as they may have the best knowledge to do this and it lays 
the burden of this task on the plate of those who profit from the data. Still, it is obvious that data 
controllers will be reluctant, to say the least, to pick up this task. First, it means yet another 
obligation to them, in which they have to be compliant and which will involve additional costs, 
perhaps yielding reduced profits. Second, data controllers may fear that their business models will 
be revealed. When consumers know the value of their personal data, they may also be able to see 
how much data controllers profit from these data. Although we think this actually constitutes a good 
reason to provide data subjects with this information, data controllers may argue that this reduces 
their competitiveness. When the value of personal data for each data controller, specifically data 
brokers, is transparent, it also reveals how (and how much) money these organisations are making. 
This reveals their business models and, when copied by competitors, may render them out of 
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business. However, there may also be opportunities for businesses here. Research shows that 
consumers that experience more control (i.e., who are able to manage and protect their privacy, for 
instance via privacy settings) are up to 52 % more willing to share information than those who are 
not.71 
When deciding that data controllers should do the pricing, it should also be taken into 
account that they may have something to gain from modifying the prices. When online services are 
paid with by personal data, it is profitable for data controllers to argue that the personal data has 
little value. In that way, they will get more personal data for their services. When payments are 
made with money, prices can be negotiated. When payments are made with personal data, this is no 
different. However, when the counterparty can first determine how much you money (i.e., your 
personal data) is worth before negotiating the price, this may be unfair. We think this problem can 
be addressed by creating objective rules for the pricing system in combination with mandatory 
transparency and supervision of data protection authorities, but this is something to take care of.  
This brings us to the third problem, which is that supervision and enforcement may be 
complicated. It may be argued that it will be quite different a task than they are used to for Data 
Protection Authorities to supervise these monetary issues. In response to this, we would argue that 
Data Protection Authorities would have to focus on legal compliance with this provision to provide 
information on the value of personal data, which is not very different from other compliance issues 
in the data protection domain. Supervision would start with verifying whether such information is 
actually provided. If so, the next step would be to verify whether the information was provided 
correctly and in an appropriate way. This problem would be similar to checking compliance with 
other information duties that data controllers have under articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR. Checking 
whether pricing information was provided correctly is something that can be checked by comparing 
prices with similar organisations and that can be realised with the investigative and corrective 
powers that Data Protection Authorities have under articles 31 and 58 of the GDPR. Data Protection 
Authorities can (ex ante) release appropriate guidelines with specific templates for the calculation 
of prices (e.g. some schemes, examples and specific proposals) and (ex post) check how data 
controllers implement such guidelines. 
A fourth problem are so-called “privacy externalities”72. An example of this is that some 
data may be already made public by data subjects through social networks. Paying with personal 
data that is available for free elsewhere may be a hard business case. However, it should be kept in 
mind that when data subjects disclose their personal data online, this does not imply consent to use 
or reuse these data for any given purpose. Further processing or reuse of data is subject to new or 
additional consent of the data subject. Another example is that, with the development of data 
retrieval technologies (i.e., data mining, machine learning, profiling)73 more and more data can be 
																																																								
71 John Rose, Olaf Rehse, and Björn Röber, The value of our digital identity (2016, New York: The Boston Consulting 
Group), p. 13. 
72 Nicola Jentzsch, The State-of-the-art of Cyber-Security and Privacy, op.cit., § 3.2.2.2. See also Stefania Gnesi, Ilaria 
Matteucci, Corrado Moiso, Paolo Mori, Marinella Petrocchi and Michele Vescovi, ‘My Data, Your Data, Our Data: 
Managing Privacy Preferences in Multiple Subjects Personal Data’, in B. Preneel and D. Ikonomou (eds.), Privacy 
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inferred or predicted from fewer and fewer raw personal data.74 This also changes the value of 
personal data. A final example is that personal data disclosed by a data subject may reveal data 
referring to other individuals75 (e.g., DNA, marital status). Accordingly, it has been argued that 
personal data of individuals are increasingly shifting towards multiple subjects’ personal data, 
where information is interdependently related to multiple transaction parties.76 Consequently, it is 
very difficult for individuals to control this chaotic flow of personal data and difficult for data 
controllers to set a stable price for them. Although all these examples influence the value of 
personal data, they do not affect the question whether there should be a right to know the value of 
your personal data.  
A final problem is that it may not be clear how and when the pricing information should be 
provided. Should it be in the privacy policy or in the general terms and conditions, should it be 
presented when registering for an online service or should it be send to users in period news 
messages? We would argue that the best approach in terms of transparency would be to use all these 
sources. However, it does not have to be decided in legislation, we think. The provision of this 
information can simply follow the reasoning of all the other information duties for data controllers 
laid down in articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR. These information duties are not phrased in a way that 
determines where and when such information should be provided.77 The only requirement is how 
the information should be provided, which can be found in Article 7, paragraph 2, which states that 
all such information should be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other 
matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. This provision 




Apart from the practical problems mentioned above, there are also some ethical and moral problems 
that can be identified when going down this road of pricing privacy.78 The first problem is that 
personal data rapidly becomes a commodity that can be traded. Personal data, however, are closely 
related to the privacy of a data subject. Commodification of privacy may be considered an 
undesirable approach, as privacy and other human rights are inalienable and non-negotiable. In the 
US, trading personal data without any legal restrictions is very common, but this is an approach that 
is frowned upon in the EU. The EU created the GDPR (and preceding legislation) exactly to avoid 
uncontrolled spreading and use of personal data in order to enable data subjects to protect their 
personal data. EU legislation specifically empowers data subjects with control rights. Therefore, we 
argue that commodification of privacy and personal data is not at risk in our proposal to introduce a 
right to know the value of your personal data. Even when people want to sell away their data 
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privacy, they are unable to do this, from a legal perspective. They will always have several 
inalienable rights with regard to their personal data, regardless of whom is processing them. Also, 
they will always have the right to withdraw their consent to such processing.79 Hence, personal data 
can be commodified, but personal data rights will still be intact. 
A second problem of pricing privacy is that the value of personal data of some people will 
be worth more than that of others. As was already explained in Section 3, personal data of people 
who have more to spend (and consequentially higher propensity to consume) will probably be 
worth more to data controllers. As a result, there may occur something which can be called ex ante 
discrimination, which personal data of poor people is less valuable and personal data of rich people 
is more valuable. This may reinforce existing disparities in society.80 Poorer people are generally 
more price-sensitive,81 while richer people are less price-sensitive, but have a higher propensity to 
consume. When attracting customers, companies may offer larger discounts to interesting (i.e., 
profitable, rich) customers. As such, rich people may get better prices and poor people may get 
lousy offers. 82  Actually, this is disputable: there are several more factors influencing price 
discrimination, e.g. it has been argued that personalization of online commercial offers should work 
to the benefit of more price-sensitive people, and so there should be lower costs for consumers with 
fewer resources.83  
In sum, although data price discrimination might be a serious problem, potentially 
increasing stigmatization and polarisation in society, there are several more factors and variables 
that distort its effects, so that pricing digital identities cannot prove to be a discriminatory practice 
itself. To the contrary, it would be a dynamic tool enhancing awareness and controllership also 
against unfair practices of data controllers. Similarly, we do not think this problem can be solved in 
data protection legislation alone. It may require stronger legislations in the domains of non-




In this paper we analyzed whether consumers/users should have a right to know the value of their 
personal data. The main reason to consider this question is because, on the one hand, the 
commodification of digital identities is an emerging reality in the data-driven economy and, on the 
other hand, individuals do not seem to be fully aware of the monetary value of their personal data 
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and tend to underestimate their economic power within the data-driven economy and to passively 
succumb to the propertization of their digital identity. Introducing a right for data subjects to know 
the value of their personal data may increase their awareness and controllership on their own 
personal information and enable them to acquire higher awareness about their power in the digital 
market and effectively empower them for the protection of their information privacy. 
We have shown that the current data-driven economy de facto already monetizes personal 
data. A variety of different online business models exist in practice, with different incentives for 
data subjects to ‘pay’ with their data. Also, EU legislation is increasingly taking into account this 
new reality. Next, we investigated different methods for quantifying the value of personal data, not 
to determine the actual prices of personal data, but to show that the monetary value of personal data 
can be quantified, a conditio-sine-qua-non for the right to know the value of your personal data. 
Furthermore, active choice models, in which users are offered the option to pay for online services, 
either with their personal data or with money, were examined. However, it was concluded that these 
models are incompatible with EU data protection law. Hence, these models do not provide a viable 
alternative to increase awareness and control of data subjects regarding their personal data. 
 Therefore, a right for data subjects to know the value of their personal data is the most 
practical and realistic approach to empower data subjects towards this commodification of digital 
identities. Informing consumers about prices is a very effective way to increase attention of 
consumers while reading pre-contractual information papers and so to increase consumers’ 
awareness. To some extent, there already is an obligation for data controllers under EU data 
protection law to inform data subjects when they consider providing personal data as ‘payment’. 
I.e., when personal data is collected that is strictly speaking unnecessary for performing the 
contract, the personal data is collected as a “counter-performance other than money” and must 
therefore be declared. If not, any such processing of personal data would be a breach of the data 
minimization principle and the purpose limitation principle. 
In articles 13, 14 and 15 the GDPR there are already several provisions about the duty to 
inform data subjects. It would be quite straightforward to add a new right to information to article 
13 and 14 GDPR reading something like: in each data processing where the value of customers’ 
personal data is relevant for the economic transaction, the price of these data should be 
communicated to the consumer. Data Protection Authorities should be entitled to monitor and 
enforce such an obligation. They could ex ante release guidelines about actual prices to be set for 
personal data, releasing tables for personalization of prices, describing circumstances in which these 
calculations could vary and ex post monitor and investigate if data controllers respect these 
guidelines. 
 It is obvious that this proposed right to know the value of your personal data also entails 
several practical problems (such as choosing a pricing method, issues regarding control and consent 
and issues regarding governance and enforcement) and moral problems (such as the 
commodification of inalienable and non-negotiable human rights and the potential reinforcement of 
existing disparities in society). We recognize that some of these problems are significant and 
provided some suggestions to mitigate them. Even though not all of these problems can be solved, 
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